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Highlights
•	 Nascent and Young firms do learn and adapt through the business creation and development 
process providing opportunity for government policy, professional advisory services and 
educational programs.
•	 A substantial proportion of these firms have aspirations for national and international sales, 
see themselves as technologically sophisticated, offering something novel, and claim to have 
some strategic advantages.
•	 Most founders expect their ventures to operate as micro/small firms. 
•	 Founders do learn to be more realistic and less optimistic as the venture develops over time.
•	 This learning usually leads to downward adjustment through lower growth aspirations, lesser 
claims of novelty and strategic advantages.
•	 Only a small minority of business start-ups undergo owner team changes, and these tend to 
occur more among teams formed with people other than a spouse.
•	 The rated importance of business planning goes down over time, but this varies depending 
on the purpose of planning. ‘As a means to think things through’ consistently remains the 
most important reason for business planning, while ‘obtaining finance’ is the least important.
Industry Partners1
The CAUSEE Study
The Comprehensive Australian Study of Entrepreneurial 
Emergence research project, or CAUSEE, is Australia’s 
largest entrepreneurship research project. It is the 
largest study of business start-ups ever undertaken 
in Australia and is the only large-scale study to 
track ventures over time. The project provides an 
exciting opportunity to improve our understanding of 
independent entrepreneurship in Australia.
CAUSEE has identified a sample of approximately 
600 emerging, but not yet operating (Nascent – NFs) 
business start-ups. As well, the project has also 
identified a further sample of approximately 600 
newly established young firms (YFs) that had already 
commenced trading. In addition, high potential, high 
growth firms have been identified and considered as a 
separate sample. All firms are being tracked over a four 
year period.
CAUSEE aims to uncover the factors that initiate, 
hinder and facilitate the process of emergence of 
new economic activities and organisations. Unlike 
much previous entrepreneurship research, the 
CAUSEE project does not put a singular focus on the 
‘entrepreneur(s)’. Assessing key characteristics of the 
venture including the venture idea, such as the degree 
and type of novelty the emerging venture has compared 
to what is already in the market, is also an important 
part of the research. Equally importantly is looking at the 
venture and the outcomes it may achieve along with the 
relationship between the characteristics of the venture 
idea and achieved outcomes.
Figure 1: From where was the data obtained?
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This report focuses on NFs and YFs who have 
‘survived’ the three years of the CAUSEE study. Given 
the time extended view taken by a longitudinal study, 
a number of firms who were included in year one have 
subsequently exited in year two and year three. In 
order for our comparisons to be valid, we have only 
included those firms who are ‘survivors’ at year three. 
Additionally, this report has not included the learning 
and adaptation behaviour of the high potential over 
sample group.
The focus of this report
This year marks the completion of data collection for 
year three (Wave 3) of the CAUSEE study. This report 
uses data from the first three years and focuses on 
the process of learning and adaptation in the business 
creation process.
Most start-ups need to change their business model, 
their product, their marketing plan, their market or 
something else about the business to be successful. 
PayPal changed their product at least five times, 
moving from handheld security, to enterprise apps, 
to consumer apps, to a digital wallet, to payments 
between handhelds before finally stumbling on the 
model that made them a multi-billion dollar company 
revolving around email-based payments. PayPal is not 
alone and anecdotes abound of start-ups changing 
direction: Symantec started as an artificial intelligence 
company, Apple started selling plans to build computers 
and Microsoft tried to peddle compilers before licensing 
an operating system out of New Mexico.
To what extent do Australian new ventures change 
and adapt as their ideas and business develop? As a 
longitudinal study, CAUSEE was designed specifically to 
observe development in the venture creation process. 
In this research briefing paper, we compare 
development over time of randomly sampled Nascent 
Firms (NF) and Young Firms (YF), concentrating on the 
surviving cases (203 NFs and 296 YFs; see Fig. 1). We 
also compare NFs with YFs at each yearly interval. The 
‘high potential’ over sample is not used in this report.2
Aspirations: to grow or not to grow?
CAUSEE focused on the aspirations of founders as 
represented by their desire to grow their business. What 
are the growth expectations that founders have in regard 
to the size of the venture going forward five years? 
We asked founders of YFs how many employees they 
expected to have working for the business in ‘five years 
from now’. In a similar vein, NFs founders were asked 
how many employees they expected to be working for 
the business when it is ‘five years old’. Then, using the 
ABS classification, we used the responses to deduce 
whether the venture, in five years time, sees itself as 
a) a micro firm (less than five employees); b) a small 
firm (five–19 employees); c) a medium firm (20–99 
employees); or d) a large firm (>100 employees).
We found that the majority of founders (> 85 per cent) 
who were interviewed across all three waves (years) 
expected their venture to operate as a ‘micro/small firm’ 
in five years time. In YFs, these expectations tended to 
be fairly consistent across Wave 1, Wave 2 and Wave 
3 (89 per cent : 93 per cent : 92 per cent). In NFs, the 
expectations tend to be consistent in the latter waves, 
Wave 2 and Wave 3 (94 per cent : 91 per cent), with a 
lower percentage reported in Wave 1 (84 per cent). 
Figure 2: Expectations of firm growth (size)
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While these results on average suggest that it is indeed 
very rare that emerging Australian ventures harbour 
ambitions of growing into medium/large firms, given that 
the medium firm lower range cut-off is 20 employees, we 
find it interesting that the majority of founders tend to have 
rather modest growth expectations. 3
Further support for this was found by asking NYs and 
YFs whether they preferred ‘maximum growth’ rather 
than going for ‘manageable size’. Our analysis of the 
change over time in the aspirations of emerging firms 
suggests that growth aspirations in general tend to 
diminish when examined over a three year period. 
In 2007, when the CAUSEE data was first collected, 
over 15 per cent of the surviving Young Firms (N=296) 
indicated that they would want the future size of their 
business to be as large as possible. These figures 
progressively dropped to approximately 12 per cent in 
2008 and 11 per cent in 2009. Similar patterns were 
found in surviving NFs (N=203) with nearly a quarter 
aspiring to achieve a large business size in 2007, and 
then decreasing to approximately 17 per cent in 2008 
and 20 per cent in 2009. The lower figure in 2008 
perhaps reflected the challenging business conditions 
caused by the global financial crisis. On the other hand, 
a majority of the surviving firms (> 80 per cent) had 
more modest aspirations from the outset indicating that 
they would prefer to establish a business which they 
could manage by themselves or with the help of a few 
employees.
Figure 3: Change in growth aspirations
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Interestingly, when comparisons are made across the 
spectrum of NFs and YFs, we find that the proportion 
of firms aspiring for large business size growth tend to 
halve in the third year (11 per cent) when compared 
with the first year (23 per cent). This is a big drop in the 
levels of aspiration.
Overall, these results indicate that emerging firms lower 
their growth aspirations over time, perhaps in line with 
the realities of the business and marketplace. It is likely 
that the consistent gradual lowering of expectations as 
firms move from Nascent to Young reflects a systematic 
recognition that the desirable capabilities, needs and 
opportunities that are necessary to grow and develop 
the venture are not as robust as they first thought. 
Change in survival confidence
The ability of a firm to be viable in the long run is based 
at some degree on its confidence in being able to 
survive. Our assessment of the survival confidence of 
emerging firms was based on the question we asked 
founders in emerging ventures as to the likelihood of 
the business being in operation five years from now. 
Our findings suggested that NFs are likely to be more 
confident in their first year of operation (mean = 86 per 
cent) in comparison with the third year (mean = 79 per 
cent). A weakening of this confidence over time possibly 
suggests that NFs are likely to lower their confidence as 
they progressively complete different business activities 
for their venture. Interestingly, we do not find a similar 
significant effect in YFs. The NF–YF difference possibly 
suggests that YFs, by the virtue of them being more 
established have more consistent confidence levels 
across time. 
Figure 4: Survival confidence over time
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Change in over-optimism
We were interested in assessing ‘over-optimism’ in 
emerging ventures as reflected by how much higher 
they rated their own survival probability to that of an 
average similar start-up in five years. To assess ‘over-
optimism’, we first asked founders to rate their survival 
likelihood in five years time and then subtracted their 
rating about the survival probability of the average firm 
in the industry to compute an ‘over-optimism’ score.
The over-optimism score for both NFs and YFs in all 
waves was positive, indicating that founders tend to 
see themselves as more successful in comparison with 
other similar firms. However such over-optimism slightly 
drops over time for both NFs and YFs, indicating that 
both groups seem to (learn to) become somewhat less 
over-optimistic over time.
Figure 5: Over-optimism over time
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National and international markets?
We assessed the change in aspirations for NFs and YFs 
in relation to sales in five years time from customers in 
Australian and international markets. The proportion of 
firms aspiring for national (as opposed to regional or 
local) and international sales over time can be important 
indicators of the broader market objectives that these 
ventures may have.
We find significant differences when NFs are compared 
with YFs with respect to national sales aspirations. 
Average data across the three waves indicates that a 
higher proportion of NFs (65 per cent) show aspirations 
towards national market sales with a corresponding 
figure of only 54 per cent for YFs. Similarly, an average 
across all three years reveals a higher proportion of NFs 
(38 per cent) in comparison with only 24 per cent YFs 
who show aspirations towards international sales. This 
suggests that NFs tend to be more confident than YFs 
in both their national and international sales aspirations. 
Figure 6: Expectations of firm growth (sales)
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When comparisons are made within groups over time, 
we find significant differences when NFs in Wave 1 
are compared with those in Wave 2 and Wave 3, with 
lower national as well as international sales aspirations 
in the latter waves. Despite these significant drops, it 
is interesting that NFs still register higher national and 
international sales aspiration levels than seen in YFs. 
While this may suggest that NF sales aspirations tend to 
be more robust in comparison with YFs, it is important 
to note that a substantial proportion of these YFs have 
actually brought some of their aspirations to fruition – 
that is, of surviving YFs over 52 per cent and nearly  
20 per cent have achieved national and international 
sales, respectively. 
Novelty over time
We asked founders of NFs and YFs for their views on how 
their ventures rate on the novelty of their business idea. 
Changes in four different aspects of novelty were assessed 
over time: 1) product/service; 2) promotion/selling; 3) 
production/sourcing; and 4) markets/customers. 
We found statistically significant differences in two 
instances: a) when NFs progress from one wave to the 
next; and b) when NF and YF groups are compared 
with each other within the same wave. Firstly, when 
NFs in Wave 1 are compared with NFs in Wave 2, we 
find that the perceived novelty scores tend to decrease 
across all the four novelty aspects. We find a similar 
pattern when Wave 2 NFs are compared with Wave 
3 NFs. A similar behaviour is typical of YFs although 
the scores do not decrease so rapidly. Secondly, 
when the NF–YF groups are compared, we find that 
NFs consistently judge their novelty higher than YFs, 
perhaps reflecting higher optimism in relation to the 
outcomes of changes to be undertaken. 5
Figure 7: Self-assessing novelty
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Interestingly, both groups rate their degree of novelty lower 
for methods of production/sourcing and promotion/selling 
relative to their offerings (i.e. product/service) and targeted 
customers/markets. This may be because the former tend 
to be ongoing incremental process improvements, often 
without being recognised as such. 
We also asked founders of both groups about their 
reasons for estimating a lower or higher degree of novelty 
than in the previous wave. Typically, among those who 
adjusted their scores downwards, 70–80 per cent said 
it was because they had realised that their idea was 
not as different from other offerings in the market as 
they previously had thought, with most of the others 
indicating that it was the actual changes in the business 
idea that caused it to become less novel. Conversely, 
among those who adjusted their assessment upwards, 
approximately 60 per cent said it was because they 
realised that their idea was more different from other 
offerings in the market than they previously thought with 
the rest saying that there was an actual change in the 
business idea to become more novel.
Technological sophistication
Emerging firms in the sample were asked about their 
perceptions in relation to aspects of technological 
sophistication. In particular, we asked two questions –  
whether R&D spending was a major priority for the 
business; and whether they would consider their 
business to be high-tech. These aspects are important 
in that firms that see themselves as technologically 
sophisticated often tend to be at the forefront in 
undertaking learning and adaptation initiatives.
Our findings indicate that a substantial number 
of emerging firms tend to view themselves as 
technologically sophisticated. The proportion of NFs 
who show R&D spending being a priority tends to 
average nearly twice relative to YFs, with the difference 
in emphasis increasing in the latter waves. 6
Figure 8: R&D spending
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High R&D spending
Although the differences in the hi-tech perceptions 
between NFs and YFs are not dramatic, they are 
consistently higher for NFs than YFs. Not only are 
the very high technological perception figures for NFs 
surprising, but the fact that they do not come down 
much over time signals that a substantial number of 
NFs show a consistently strong inclination towards R&D 
spending and hi-tech orientation. Correspondingly, for 
YFs the R&D spending emphasis goes down significantly 
over the three years, perhaps an indication of the 
depletion of scarce resources that YFs have at hand. 
Figure 9: Hi-tech perceptions
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Hi-Tech Perceptions
Gaining and sustaining strategic 
advantages
A vast majority of the surveyed firms (namely 92 to 98 
per cent) across the three years indicated that they 
possess some form of strategic advantage that is 
key to their business success. While the proportion 
of NFs who said they had some form of strategic 
advantage was at the lower end of the spectrum in 
Wave 2 (i.e. 92 per cent) perhaps on account of the 
challenging business conditions of the global financial 
crisis – only a small proportion of emerging firms said 7
that their business had no particular advantage. This is 
encouraging as the majority of emerging firms appear to 
identify, assign due importance, and be confident about 
the strategic advantages they possess in a competitive 
marketplace.
Across the three years, of those who indicated they had 
some form of competitive advantage, the proportion of 
NFs who felt that it will be difficult for other businesses to 
copy their advantage was consistent across the first two 
waves (48 per cent–Wave 1; 47 per cent–Wave 2) with a 
slightly lower number reported for the third year (41 per 
cent). YFs showed a similar pattern. On the contrary, when 
asked whether competitors could easily match/copy their 
business advantage, it appears that YFs more than NFs 
realise over time their advantage is not as strong as they 
previously thought.
Figure 10: Sustainability of competitive advantages
   Easy to copy     Difficult to copy
60
55
50
45
40
35
30
Wave 1 Wave 2 Wave 3
Nascent Firms
47.7%  47.4% 
40.9% 
42.1% 
46.1%  44.9% 
60
55
50
45
40
35
30
Wave 1 Wave 2 Wave 3
Young Firms
44.9% 
52.2% 
40.4% 
51.8% 
36.4% 
41.9% 
Changes to the founder/owner 
team
To examine how team compositions change over 
time, we looked at whether new members joined or 
others exited over the three year period. Essentially, we 
compared across three groups: 1) solo founder; 2) with 
spouse team; and 3) with others team.
Figure 11: Most firms do not change their structure
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Comparisons made between consecutive waves show 
that only a small minority of firms undergo changes in 
ownership. These changes are generally a bit higher for 
the NFs relative to YFs and are more likely in the cases of 
teams formed with others. On the other hand, solo firms 
for both NFs and YFs tend to have the least ownership 
changes. While it is less surprising that solo firms change 
the least over time, it is interesting that teams formed 
in partnership with spouses appear to be less prone to 
ownership changes than teams formed with others. 8
Change in the use of the 
business plan
Over 60 per cent of the emerging firms who had a 
business plan in the first year (56 per cent of NFs and 
47 per cent of YFs) reported making revisions since 
it was first written. The gap between NFs and YFs 
widened in the second and third years, with just over 
50 per cent of the surveyed NFs and 62 per cent of the 
YFs indicating they had revised their business plan in 
the last 12 months.
We next examined how emerging firms put their business 
plans to use over the three year period. Our analysis 
identified four key uses: 1) as a step-wise action plan; 2) as 
a means to obtain external finance; 3) as a means to think 
through things to avoid mistakes and; 4) as a means to 
facilitate internal communication. The use of the business 
plan as a means to think things through stands out as the 
most important and is followed by its use as a means to 
facilitate internal communication. Both these uses tend to 
remain relatively stable across the three waves. The use of 
the business plan as an action plan is also quite important, 
but goes down over time for both groups with a rebound 
in the last wave for YFs. This downward-then-upward 
trend may mean that founders are initially disappointed 
with the limited usefulness of the plan for this purpose in 
the highly uncertain and malleable conditions that prevail 
during early development. Possible as things stabilise, 
using the business plan as a step-by-step action plan 
becomes feasible. Somewhat surprisingly, the importance 
accorded to the use of a business plan to secure external 
finance decreases for YFs after the first wave. We also 
found that NFs consistently score higher than YFs across 
the three waves. 
Figure 12: Use of business plan by firms which 
survived all three waves
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Overall, our findings indicate that a substantial majority 
of emerging firms which prepared a business plan 
actively use it and regularly upgrade it. The variation in 
usage of a business plan over time provides support 
for its usefulness in the business planning process.
However when we asked NFs and YFs to indicate the 
planned use of their business plans in 12 month’s time, 
all uses of the business plan appeared to be rated less 
importantly.
Figure 13: Anticipated use of a business plan
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So what does all this mean?
The findings in this report highlight a number of 
areas that those involved in the venture creation and 
development process should be mindful of, and also 
identifies potential opportunities for improved support to 
the development of new ventures.
From a policy and business incentive perspective it 
seems that policy makers should not assume or expect 
that most firms will respond to financial incentives to 
grow – the reality is that many ventures appear to not 
want to grow into big organisations. The analysis of 
the CAUSEE data certainly identifies quite modest 
growth expectations. Perhaps industry and government 
focus needs to be on encouraging more new ventures 
to start, and assisting these ventures in developing 
the skills and activities earlier in their developmental 
lifecycle, so that they have a greater likelihood of 
surviving and making a positive contribution to overall 
economic growth.
There is certainly cause to recognise that it is tougher 
out in the marketplace than perhaps founders initially 
thought as reflected in that relatively more founders find 
reason for ‘downward’ adjustments in things such as 
growth aspiration and idea novelty than those finding 
opportunities and strengths being greater than they first 
thought. There was a noticeable impact of the global 
financial crisis in a redefining of founders expectations, 
and these have appeared to continue to trend either 
downwardly or at best flatlined. This impact may also 
be reflected in the relatively low aspirational levels that 
business founders have in the potential growth of their 
ventures over time.
The ‘realities’ from getting ‘dirty and sweaty’ building 
a business are reflected in the lower levels of optimism 
expressed by Young firms as compared with Nascent 
firms. It is also expressed in the differences in aspirations 
as regards overall growth and market focus. This 
presents an opportunity for advisors to help firms in early 
stages with being more realistic about their degree of 
novelty, their technological sophistication and the value 
that may or may not bring, as well as a more careful 
consideration of their strategic strengths. Understanding 
these more realistically may help to more appropriately 
focus the developing venture on the things that will 
contribute to their sustained success and growth. 
Business planning appears to be a valued exercise 
with a number of expressed uses, however in line with 
previous findings, consideration needs to be given to 
more action orientated planning that is not done once 
and shelved, but more importantly interlinked with the 
ongoing growth and development of the business. 
The findings suggest a reduced use over time of the 
business plan as an ‘action plan’. This again presents 
an opportunity for advisors to assist new ventures with 
tools that ‘add value’ to the business as much as they 
provide information for other stakeholders. Developing 
new ventures is as much about action as it is about 
planning and we need to be careful from an educational 
and advisory perspective that the use of the business 
plan does not come at the cost of actions that drive the 
venture forward.
Whilst the analysis tends to suggest downward 
movement in overall levels of founder aspirations, this 
need not be considered as a negative effect. Rather, it 
can be argued that it as a clear indicator that founders 
and participants in Nascent and Young firms, do 
learn and can adapt, as evidenced in this report. This 
continued ability to learn and adapt provides continued 
opportunities for policy, advisory activities and 
educational programs to contribute even more to the 
support and development of these ventures. CRICOS No.00213J © QUT 2010 17173
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